Decolonization and the Politics of Recognition: the Case of Somaliland
Abstract
Somaliland’s pursuit of international recognition offers a distinctive lens through which to analyse the intersections of decolonisation, self-determination, and the legal-political entrenchment of colonial-era boundaries. Having declared independence from Somalia in 1991, Somaliland has built a relatively stable and functioning state. Yet, more than three decades later, it remains outside the international system of recognised sovereign states. This persistent liminality raises pressing questions about how principles such as uti possidetis juris and self-determination are interpreted and operationalised, particularly in the African context.
Historical Background and Legal Foundations
The case of Somaliland is anchored in a specific colonial and post-colonial trajectory. A former British protectorate, Somaliland gained independence on June 26, 1960, and was recognised by a number of states, including the United Kingdom, Egypt, and Ethiopia (International Crisis Group, 2006). However, within five days, it voluntarily united with the Trust Territory of Somalia (the former Italian Somaliland) to form the Somali Republic. This union was driven by pan-Somali nationalism and hopes of uniting all Somali-inhabited territories into one state.
The legal framework underpinning this union was fragile from the start. While both territories passed Acts of Union, there were discrepancies between them, and crucially, no unified legal act was ever ratified by both parliaments (Bryden, 2004). The union thus lacked full constitutional legitimacy, a fact that has been repeatedly cited by Somalilanders as grounds for their claim to have resumed sovereignty, rather than seceded.
Following the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 after years of civil war and the fall of Siad Barre’s regime, Somaliland declared the restoration of its independence within the borders of the former British protectorate. Since then, it has maintained a de facto state with functioning institutions, regular elections, and a monopoly over the use of force in its territory (Walls, 2011).
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The Montevideo Criteria and the Case for Recognition
The right to self-determination is a cornerstone of international law, enshrined in instruments such as the United Nations Charter and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (United Nations, 1966). However, its application is uneven and highly politicised. In the African context, the right is often subordinated to the principle of territorial integrity, reflecting the OAU’s - and later the African Union’s - priority of preserving post-colonial borders.
Somaliland claims that its people have exercised both internal and external self-determination. Internally, they have built functioning institutions, elected leaders through relatively democratic processes, and maintained peace and security in contrast to the instability plaguing Somalia (Bradbury, 2008). Externally, the declaration of independence in 1991 was endorsed by a wide range of domestic actors, including clan elders and political leaders.
From the perspective of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933), Somaliland satisfies the four key criteria of statehood:
A permanent population: The territory has a stable population that identifies as Somalilanders.
A defined territory: Its borders coincide with those of the former British Somaliland.
A government: Somaliland has functioning executive, legislative, and judicial institutions.
The capacity to enter into relations with other states: While not formally recognised, Somaliland maintains informal relations with several states, including Ethiopia, the UAE, and Taiwan (Richards, 2014).
Despite this, statehood in practice depends not just on fulfilling criteria, but also on recognition by other states (Crawford, 2006). Here, Somaliland remains stalled in a paradox: it functions as a state, but lacks international legitimacy.
A key legal and political obstacle to Somaliland's recognition is the principle of uti possidetis juris, which requires postcolonial states to maintain the borders inherited at independence. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted this principle in 1964 to prevent border conflicts and promote stability (Shaw, 1996). While this principle helped avoid the extensive redrawing of African borders, it also entrenched colonial boundaries that often ignored ethnic, cultural, and historical realities.
Somaliland's claim is paradoxically based on uti possidetis juris. It argues that it should be recognized within the colonial borders of the British protectorate. In this sense, Somaliland is not attempting to redraw borders arbitrarily but rather to restore a pre-existing legal entity. The African Union (AU) has nonetheless been cautious, fearing that recognizing Somaliland might encourage other secessionist movements across the continent, potentially destabilizing other fragile states (Clapham, 1998).
Self-Determination vs. Territorial Integrity
International law recognizes the right of peoples to self-determination, as enshrined in the UN Charter and other instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (United Nations, 1966). However, this right is often interpreted within the limits of existing state boundaries. In practice, external self-determination (i.e., secession) is considered legitimate only in cases of decolonization, foreign occupation, or extreme internal repression.
Somaliland argues that it satisfies both the historical and remedial justifications for external self-determination. Historically, it was a sovereign entity for a brief period in 1960 and entered the union with Somalia voluntarily, though under dubious legal circumstances. Remedially, its people faced systematic persecution under the Barre regime, which undermined the legitimacy of the union (Human Rights Watch, 1990).
Critics argue, however, that granting recognition to Somaliland could undermine Somalia’s territorial integrity and encourage further fragmentation. The federal government of Somalia strongly opposes Somaliland’s independence, asserting that national unity is essential for state-building and post-conflict recovery. Some scholars warn that the proliferation of new states could erode the international legal order and fuel conflict in other regions (Heraclides, 1991).
The Role of the African Union and the International Community
In 2005, an African Union fact-finding mission acknowledged Somaliland’s unique case and recommended that it not be equated with other secessionist movements. The mission report noted that the union with Somalia was never fully legalised and that Somaliland’s stability and democratic governance made it an exception (African Union, 2005). Despite this, the AU has taken no formal action, and most member states remain hesitant.
The international community's reluctance to recognise Somaliland is rooted in broader geopolitical concerns. Major powers have generally deferred to the AU’s position, prioritizing regional stability over recognition. Moreover, Western states have often adopted a pragmatic approach, supporting Somalia’s federal government as a bulwark against terrorism and instability in the Horn of Africa (ICG, 2006).
Nonetheless, some scholars argue that non-recognition has real consequences for Somaliland. It limits access to international financial institutions, prevents formal diplomatic engagement, and constrains development aid (Richards, 2014). These limitations persist despite the region's relatively high levels of stability, security, and democratic governance.
A Decolonial Lens: Beyond Legalism
From a decolonial perspective, Somaliland’s experience illustrates how the decolonization process, while intended to liberate colonized peoples, has often reproduced the structures and boundaries imposed by colonial powers. Scholars such as Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013) argue that decolonization must go beyond the transfer of sovereignty to include a rethinking of borders, governance, and legitimacy.
In this view, Somaliland’s predicament reveals a postcolonial double bind. On one hand, it seeks legitimacy by aligning with colonial-era borders and legal norms. On the other hand, it is denied recognition because those same norms prioritize territorial integrity and political expediency over historical specificity and lived realities.
A decolonial approach would call for greater flexibility in interpreting self-determination and recognition, placing emphasis on local legitimacy, historical context, and effective governance. This does not necessarily mean endorsing every secessionist movement, but it does suggest that rigid adherence to inherited boundaries may not always serve the interests of justice or stability.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Building on the analysis presented, several policy recommendations emerge that could help address the legal ambiguities, political constraints, and decolonial dilemmas surrounding Somaliland’s quest for recognition.
The AU has long prioritised territorial integrity over self-determination to avoid secessionist domino effects. However, it should consider establishing a normative exception clause to assess cases that fall outside the conventional framework of secession. Such a clause would acknowledge historically unique situations, such as Somaliland’s unratified union and prior sovereignty, without opening the floodgates to widespread fragmentation. By introducing context-specific criteria, the AU could uphold regional stability while accommodating legitimate, peaceful claims to statehood.
International partners should adopt a dual-track engagement policy that allows for formalised cooperation with Somaliland in development, security, and governance, without necessarily granting diplomatic recognition. This pragmatic approach would reflect Somaliland’s on-the-ground functionality while maintaining support for Somalia’s federal state-building. Modeled on informal engagements with entities like Taiwan or Palestine, this strategy could enhance regional stability and service delivery without forcing a premature resolution to the recognition debate.
Third, there is a pressing need to revisit the principle of uti possidetis juris through a postcolonial lens. While originally intended to preserve peace, its rigid application often entrenches colonial-era injustices and undermines genuine expressions of self-determination. Legal scholars and policymakers should advocate for a more flexible, contextualised interpretation, particularly in cases like Somaliland, where historical sovereignty, popular legitimacy, and effective governance intersect. This rethinking should be driven by African legal institutions and scholars to ensure locally grounded perspectives shape evolving norms.
Finally, the AU could take proactive steps by initiating a mediation mechanism focused on exploring asymmetric sovereignty arrangements between Somaliland and Somalia. Such models - ranging from confederation to free association - could offer a constructive middle ground, providing Somaliland with international engagement avenues while preserving Somali territorial integrity in principle. A dedicated AU envoy and structured dialogue process could reduce the zero-sum nature of the debate and create the space for compromise, informed by comparative models from other regions and grounded in mutual respect.
All in all, the case of Somaliland challenges conventional understandings of statehood, recognition, and decolonization. It meets the legal criteria for statehood and has demonstrated effective self-governance for over three decades. Yet, its lack of recognition highlights the political nature of international law and the enduring legacy of colonial boundaries.
Somaliland’s experience invites a re-evaluation of how international actors interpret the principles of self-determination and territorial integrity. A more nuanced, context-specific approach - one that takes into account historical injustices, legal ambiguities, and practical governance - may offer a path forward. Ultimately, the case suggests the need for a more flexible and inclusive international order, capable of accommodating the complex realities of postcolonial statehood.
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